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August 16,

1961

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE/

BERLIN AND GERMANY
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
have read partial texts and news accounts of Soviet Premier Khrushchev's
recent addresses. These reports are
sufficient to make clear that Mr. Khrushchev has a view of the attitudes of
this Nation regarding peace, Berlin, and
Germany which is not accurate. Further, they indicate that his views on
these questions require elaboration if we
are to appreciate the peaceful intent
which is professed in them. The recent
intensification of the danger of a blowup in the divided city, with incalculable
consequences, emphasize the need for a
prompt clarification.
Mr. Khrushchev is wrong, if he mistakes the voice of any fraction of the
people of this Nation for the voice of
the Nation on the issues of peace and
war. The right of peaceful dissent is
an inherent part of a system of freedom. But in the last analysis, the
voices to which Mr. Khrushchev needs
to pay attention in this Nation are those
of the President and the Secretary of
State. For regardless of dissent, bellicosity, or whatever in other quarters, it
is the President who will determine the
critical courses of action of the entire
Nation. And under the President, only
the Secretary of State is equipped to
interpret his decisions in policy.
The President and the Secretary of
State speak not for war, but for peace-not merely at Berlin and Germany, but
everywhere on the globe. And they
speak, too, for the defense of our rights
which our national self-respect, no less
than the grandeur of Russia of which
Mr. Khrushchev spoke, requires us to
preserve against threats or the hostile
acts of others.
If Mr. Khrushchev means no harm to
those rights at Berlin-and he insists
in his statements that he does not--then
there can be peace at Berlin. Beyond
the defense of those rights against unilateral change by others, as I have said
many times, I am not wedded to any
particular situation at Berlin. I am
personally persuaded that other situations can be d eveloped, situations far
better than that which has now existed
for so many years despite the enormous
changes in Germany and Europe and the
world since World War II.
Indeed, Mr. Khrushchev has taken the
initiative in this matter. He has-insisted
that the situation in Berlin must be
changed. He has also insisted that the
changes will not infringe upon our rights
in that city, including the rights of access to West Berlin. Unfortunately, until now at least, he has indicated the
changes which he desires, but he has not
set forth in specifics how Western rights
would be protected. What we really
need, if there is to be peace as well as
change at Berlin, is an elaboration on
what the changes which Khrushchev
proposes may mean. For example:
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First. Mr. Khrushchev has contended
that the East Germans can succeed to
Soviet occupation rights in East Berlin
by unilateral action. Does he recognize
equally, then, that West Germans can
succed to Western rights of occupation
in and access to West Berlin by unilateral action of the Western Powers?
Second. Since all of Berlin has been
a common occupational responsibility of
the Allied Powers; that is, the Soviet
Union, France, Britain, and the United
States, does it not follow that any peaceful change in the status of a part of Berlin to that of a free and neutralized city,
must be coupled with a change of the status of all of Berlin, Soviet, and Western
occupied enclaves, to that of a free city?
I think that Mr. Khrushchev will recognize that unless he is prepared to extend
his proposal of a free ·city to the entire
city of Berlin-which he has never suggested-what he proposes is a unilateral
change which is at least a political and
ideological act of aggression even if it
does not involve an act of military aggression.
Third. Mr. Khrushchev insists that
the routes of access to Berlin will remain
open after he signs a peace treaty with
East Germany. He says that there will
be any guarantees necessary to achieve
this end. But what kind of guarantees?
Will East Germany have control of the
routes of access after a peace treaty is
signed? Will Russian forces remain in
control of them? Will they be transferred to the Western Powers whose
forces remain in West Berlin, which
would be most logical inasmuch as the
Soviet Union is the nation which desires
to withdraw from its occupational responsibility? Or, If control is transferred to the East Germans, will the Soviet Union recognize and support the
right of the Western nations to use whatever means may be necessary to guarantee access to Berlin If it should subsequently be impeded?
These, Mr. President, are some of the
questions which must be faced and answered now, if there is to be a change at
Berlin, a change in peace. These are
some of the questions which must be answered to give substance to the assertions
of peaceful intent which emanate from
Moscow.
Mr. Khrushchev has said that we
should sit down at a table and negotiate.
I should like to think that these are the
type of questions, Mr. President, at least
as regards Berlin, which would form the
substance of negotiations. I see little
virtue at this time in trying to deal with
these questions in a full-dress conference
with all the theatrical trappings of an
international melodrama. But I see
much virtue in quiet, sober, preliminary
discussions of these questions. I would
suggest that we have an outstanding Ambassador in Moscow, and the Russian
Ambassador in this city is most capable.
The task might well begin with an exploration of the questions by these men
and the diplomats of other nations involved. Or, if this means of communication is inadequate, others can be devised. It is not so important, Mr. President, who may initiate negotiations or in
what circumstances they may be initiated; I should think the people of the

